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The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia 
and the International Law of Self-
Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's 
Right to Secede 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia, two republics of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, declared their indepen-
dence. 1 Generally, the international community reacted nega-
tively to Slovenia's and Croatia's secessionist actions. 2 The United 
States stated that it would not recognize Slovenia or Croatia under 
any circumstances, and the European Community (EC) an-
nounced that it expected Yugoslavia to remain one country.3 
Many members of the international community insisted that Yu-
goslavia remain intact in accordance with the international legal 
principle of territorial integrity, which prohibits the changing of 
borders.4 Underlying the reluctance to recognize Slovenia and 
Croatia was a fear of violence in Europe and the precedent that 
independence would establish for the multitude of separatist eth-
nic groups in Eastern Europe.5 
World opinion of Slovenia's and Croatia's actions changed, 
however, after a Yugoslav army offensive against Slovenia.6 Some 
commentators noted that the initial U.S. and EC policies might 
have encouraged the violent actions of the Yugoslav army.' Fol-
lowing the military action, and possibly because they realized their 
policies may have provoked the violence, the United States and 
EC began to voice their support of the republics. In doing so, the 
United States and EC cited such fundamental values as freedom 
and the right to self-determination.8 
I Yugoslavia Is Such A Bother, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 41 [hereinafter Such A 
Bother]. 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 Jill Smolowe, Yugoslavia: Out of Control, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 26, 28. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. The U.S. and EC decisions may have been influenced by Germany's and Austria's 
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The right of Slovenia and Croatia to determine their own 
political, economic, social, and cultural development is an issue 
that has consequences for ethnic minorities around the world, 
particularly in Eastern Europe. Since the fall of Eastern Europe's 
communist regimes in 1989, nationalism has become an increas-
ingly potent force. 9 Nationalism has encouraged ethnic minorities 
to voice demands for recognition, the restructuring of govern-
ments, and even the redrawing of borders.1O Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia, for example, have successfully asserted their inde-
pendence. ll The continued existence of the Soviet Union has 
been drawn into question. l2 Nationalist groups elsewhere in East-
ern Europe are now vocally asserting themselves as well. l3 
An examination of the principle of self-determination can assist 
in judging the legitimacy of actions by ethnic minorities against 
parent states. The principle of self-determination gives certain 
peoples a right to exercise local autonomy.l4 International law 
defines "peoples" subjectively, by focusing on the will of a group.l5 
International law also defines peoples objectively, by requiring a 
group to possess common objective characteristics. l6 The princi-
ple of self-determination can grant peoples autonomy ranging 
from simple participation in government to full self-govern-
ment. l7 Whether the principle of self-determination includes a 
right to secede from an existing state, however, has been widely 
support of Slovenia and Croatia. See David Binder, Some Western Nations Split Off Yugoslavia, 
N.Y. TIMES,July 3,1991, at A6. 
9 Martin Sieff, Ethnic Rivalries Spill Across Map, WASH. TIMES, June 25, 1990, at AI, 
All. 
10 Id. 
11 Arthur M. Cox, In a National Tailspin, the Soviet Union Must Fill the Power Vacuum, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at 2. 
12 Id. 
I3 Thirteen of the fifteen Soviet republics have declared themselves independent. Cox, 
supra note 11, at 2. The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is in the process of drafting 
a new democratic constitution. The Slovaks are insisting on a preliminary treaty between 
Czech and Slovak republics that would guarantee a unilateral right of secession. Lloyd N. 
Cutler, The Dilemma of Secession, WASH. POST, July 21, 1991, at C7. In Romania, the ethnic 
Hungarians of Transylvania are seeking local autonomy. Janusz Bugajski, Balkanization 
As A Blessing, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1990, at 18. 
H See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 9-11 
(1978). 
15 Id. at 9-10. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 Id. at 11-12. 
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disputed. 18 In the post-World War I era, self-determination was 
initially identified as the right of all peoples to an independent 
state. 19 Since the end of World War II and the beginning of the 
process of decolonization which followed, self-determination has 
been more restricted.20 
This Comment assesses the legitimacy of the secessionist actions 
of Slovenia and Croatia in light of the principle of self-determi-
nation. Part I identifies the parties and the dispute over the right 
to secede under Yugoslav constitutional law. Part II traces the 
development of the principle of self-determination, while Part 
III examines the modern concept of self-determination. Part IV 
applies the principle of self-determination to the present situation 
in Yugoslavia. This Comment concludes that under international 
law, Slovenes and Croats are peoples who have the right to self-
determination, and, consequently, the right to self-government. 
This Comment also concludes, however, that Slovenia and Croatia 
do not have a right to secede because this right has not yet been 
recognized under international law. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA 
Yugoslavia is a federation of six republics and two autonomous 
provinces.21 Eight major ethnic populations live in areas roughly 
corresponding to the political divisions of the federation. 22 Each 
ethnic population, however, is represented in other republics or 
18 See Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to 
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257,271 (1981). 
19 See ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 39 
(1969). 
20 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 16-20. 
21 The republics of Yugoslavia are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Mon-
tenegro, and Macedonia. Serbia possesses two autonomous provinces: the province of 
Vojvodina and the province of Kosovo. See Kenneth C. Danforth, Yugoslavia: A House 
Much Divided, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1990, at 92, 104-05. 
22 Id. The names of the republics generally correspond to their majority populations. 
The province of Kosovo, however, possesses an Albanian majority. Id. Additionally, the 
province of Vojvodina possesses a significant Hungarian population, although Serbs are 
in the majority. See PEDRO RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963-
198368 (1984). The 1981 Yugoslav census counted 22.4 million people, consisting of 9.3 
million Serbs, 4.6 million Croats, 4.1 million Bosnians, 1.9 million Macedonians, 1.8 
million Slovenes, 590,000 Montenegrins, 1.7 million Albanians, and 470,000 Hungarians. 
The census also counted 120,000 Turks, 83,000 Slovaks, 58,000 Romanians, and 70,485 
Gypsies. BRUCE McFARLANE, YUGOSLAVIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 2 (1988). 
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provinces.23 Additionally, there are a significant number of ethnic 
minorities in Yugoslavia.24 This ethnic mixture has resulted in 
the use of four official languages, a host of unofficial languages, 
and two different alphabets.25 The cultural diversity is further 
emphasized by the existence of three major religions that are 
practiced primarily along ethnic lines.26 
A. The Parties to the Crisis 
The constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia arises from a dispute 
over the future political relationships among the country's re-
publics and provinces.27 Croatia and Slovenia, with some support 
from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo, favor a loose 
confederal system, rather than the centralized, federal system 
endorsed by Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina.28 Powerful Ser-
bia's resistance to negotiating a confederal arrangement has led 
Slovenia and Croatia to take steps toward secession from Yugo-
slavia. The federal government has resorted to military action to 
preserve the union.29 
23 RAMET, supra note 22, at xvi. 
24 McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 2. 
25 The four official languages are Serbo-Croatian, Sloven ian, Macedonian, and Alban-
ian. Danforth, supra note 21, at 104. 
26 Roman Catholics comprise 32 percent of the population, and are primarily either 
Croats or Slovenes. Orthodox Christians constitute 41 percent of the population, and are 
primarily Serbs, Montenegrins, or Macedonians. Muslims constitute 12 percent of the 
population, and include Bosnians, Albanians (Kosovo-Metohians), and Turks. Mc-
FARLANE, supra note 22, at 2. 
27 See Jonathan S. Landay, Slovenia Formalizes Independence Plebiscite Results, UPI, Dec. 
26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
28 Judy Dempsey, Republican Leaders Try to Hold Yugoslavia Together, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 
10, 1991, at 4. 
29 Warfare in Yugoslavia has left more than 600 people dead and has caused billions 
of dollars worth of property damage. Tony Smith, Croatian, Yugoslavian Army Leaders Sign 
Cease-Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1991, at 2. Additionally, 140,000 people have been 
displaced. John Tagliabue, Serbia Says It Is Accepting European Peace Proposal, N.V. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Tagliabue, Serbia Says]. Fighting began in Slovenia shortly 
after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on June 25,1991 when federal troops 
moved into Slovenia and recaptured republican border posts. Since July, fighting has 
centered in Croatia, where members of Croatia's ethnic Serbian minority have rebelled 
in opposition to Croatia's secession. The Yugoslav army has claimed that it is acting as a 
buffer between the Croats and Serbian insurgents, but the Serbian-dominated military is 
actually supporting Serbian guerillas. Richard Boucher, Call for a Cease-fire in Yugoslavia, 
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman (Aug. 29, 1991) in DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, 
Sept. 2, 1991, at 652; Tagliabue, Serbia Says, supra. Croatia is on the verge of declaring 
war against Yugoslavia to assert its independence and to respond to the actions of Serbs 
and the Yugoslav army. It appears that the war may spread as fighting in southern Croatia 
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The polarization within Yugoslavia, however, is not solely the 
result of differing views of the proper role of states within a 
union. 3D The crisis represents a resurgence of nationalist conflicts 
that have frequently arisen since the formation of Yugoslavia in 
1918.31 The crisis involves the traditional fears of Croats, Slov-
enes, and the other nationalities that their state would be con-
trolled by Serbs.32 Non-Serbs believe that a strong central Yugos-
lav federal government permits Serbia, the largest republic in 
size and population, to dominate government.33 
In addition to ethnicity, differences in religion and wealth also 
characterize the parties to the conflict. 34 Slovenes and Croats are 
Roman Catholics while Serbs are Orthodox Christians.35 Addi-
tionally, the Slovene and Croatian economies are strong enough 
to compete in western markets. The other republics are less-
developed and in need of economic aid.36 
The crisis also involves opposing political philosophies. Serbia 
is communist, while Croatia and Slovenia are non-communistY 
Some have attributed Serbia's support for an autocratic commu-
nist regime to such a regime's ability to suppress opposition from 
the other republics and preserve the Serbian-dominated system.38 
In contrast, a confederation, where considerable power is re-
tained by the republics, would assure local control over purely 
internal matters. This arrangement would secure the benefits of 
cooperation in matters of common interest, such as defense. 39 
has intensified and Bosnia-Hercegovina has begun to aid Croatia with information on 
Serbian movements. Additionally, further strife may occur as a result of Macedonia's vote 
to become independent if a Yugoslav confederation cannot be established. John Tagliabue, 
Yugoslav Republic Votes To Secede, The Third To Do So, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at AI, 
A6. 
30 See Vladimir Jadranic, Army, Croatia Fulfill De-Escalation Accord, UPI, Jan. 26, 1991, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
31 Id. 
32 [d. 
33 See Landay, supra note 27. 
34 See Jadranic, supra note 30; Landay, supra note 27. 
35 McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 2. 
36 See Landay, supra note 27. 
37 Yugoslavia Crackdown, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1991, at 8. Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Her-
cegovina, and Macedonia removed Communists from power in elections in 1990 and 
installed nationalist parties. Serbia and Montenegro retained communist leadership in 
elections held in December 1990, but the Communist Party changed its name to the 
Socialist Party. Yugoslavia, Against the Grain, ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 1990, at 48. 
38 Landay, supra note 27. 
39 Croatian and Slovene Presidencies Propose Model of Yugoslav Confederation, British Broad-
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B. Positions of the Parties 
In their attempt to move the country toward a confederation, 
Slovenia and Croatia held plebiscites on the issue of indepen-
dence. Both republics voted for independence if a confederation 
could not be established in Yugoslavia.40 Slovenia and Croatia 
also adopted new republican constitutional provisions,41 giving 
themselves the right to secede from the existing Yugoslav fed-
eration.42 
Slovenia and Croatia maintain that they have a constitutional 
right to self-determination, including a right to secede.43 The 
casting Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Current File [hereinafter Model Confederation]. 
40 Such A Bother, supra note 1, at 41. In Slovenia, in the plebiscite conducted on 
December 23, 1990, 88.5 percent favored autonomy and the independence of Slovenia. 
Landay, supra note 27. Croatia conducted a plebiscite on May 19, 1991 in which 94 percent 
voted in favor of independence. It is estimated that 83 percent of the population voted. 
Yugoslavia: The Lookers-On, ECONOMIST, May 25, 1991, at 53, 54 [hereinafter Lookers-On]. 
41 The Croatian Assembly, the Sabor, adopted a new constitution on December 24, 
1990. Article 135 of the new constitution regulates how alliances between Croatia and 
other states may be formed or dissolved. To form or dissolve alliances, one-third of the 
Chamber of Representatives-one of the three legislative bodies constituting the Assem-
bly-must submit a proposal, and two-thirds of the Croatian Assembly must approve it. 
Decisions become final if more than 50 percent of registered voters approve the resolution 
in a referendum conducted within 30 days. In emergency situations, however, Croatia 
could secede by a vote of only two-thirds of the Chamber of Representatives present, 
without any requirement for a referendum. New Constitution of Croatia Adopted, British 
Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Current File. Amendment 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia gives Slovenia the right to secede. SFRY Presidency Condemns Slovene and Croatian 
Resolutions on Separation, British Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 
4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File [hereinafter SFRY Presidency 
Condemns]. 
42 It is unclear whether the Yugoslav Constitution recognizes a right to secede. If it 
does not recognize secession, the republican constitutional provisions violate article 206 
of the Yugoslav Constitution which states that republican constitutions may not contradict 
the federal constitution. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGO-
SLAVIA, art. 206 translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: YUGO-
SLAVIA 29, 119 (1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION]. See Milan Kucan, Speech at LCY 
Central Committee Session, Sept. 16, 1989, reprinted in British Broadcasting Corp., Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File 
[hereinafter Kucan Speech]. Milan Kucan, the Slovene President, argued to the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia's Central Committee on September 29, 1989 that a republican 
right to secede does not conflict with the Yugoslav Constitution. He claimed that a 
republican right to secede is merely at odds with the Serbian Presidency'S view of the 
federation. Under that view, the federal government delegates sovereign functions to the 
republics as federal administrative units, and not as sovereign republics. Kucan Speech, 
supra. 
43 See Kucan Speech, supra note 42. 
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1946 federal constitution had granted the republics both these 
rights.44 Furthermore, the 1963 constitution and the present con-
stitution, adopted in 1974, state that these rights belong to the 
"nations of Yugoslavia."45 At the same time, however, the current 
constitution includes a number of provisions that may deny a 
right to secede. Article 203, for example, precludes the use of 
constitutionally-granted rights in ways which threaten the exis-
tence of the state or in ways which "stir up national, racial, or 
religious hatred or intolerance."46 Secession may threaten the 
existence of the state, thus article 203 may nullify a republican 
right to secede. Article 244 of the constitution also appears to 
preclude secession by guaranteeing Yugoslavia its territorial in-
tegrity.47 On the other hand, the constitution contemplates 
changes in Yugoslavia's borders in articles 5 and 283.48 Article 5 
requires the consent of all republics and provinces before the 
borders of Yugoslavia can be altered.49 Article 283 gives the Yu-
goslav Assembly the power to determine alterations in the state's 
boundaries. 50 Thus, the provisions of the constitution seem to 
suggest that secession is possible if the federal government and 
all of the republics and provinces agree to it. 
The Yugoslav Presidency has conceded that nations have a 
right to self-determination and secession, and that all nations in 
Yugoslavia are sovereign. 51 Furthermore, the Presidency has 
stated that "no solutions will be or can be imposed upon any 
nation if [the solutions] are not in accordance with the nation's 
freely expressed will and interests."52 The Yugoslav Presidency, 
however, views Slovenia's plebiscite as an illegal act of secession 
44 RAMET, supra note 22, at 78. 
45 CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at Introductory Part, Basic Principles 1. The Basic 
Principles of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia states: "The 
nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, 
including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common 
struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist 
Revolution ... have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a 
federal republic .... " Id. 
46 Id. at art. 203. 
47 See id. at art. 244. 
48 Id. at arts. 5, 283(5). 
49 Id. at art. 5. 
SOld. at art. 283(5). 
51 SFRY Presidency Says Slovene Plebiscite" Unconstitutional" Slovene Reply, British Broad-
casting Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Current File [hereinafter SFRY Presidency Says]. 
52 Id. 
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because it is a unilateral act that ignores the interests of other 
Yugoslav nations. 53 The Presidency contends that before seced-
ing, Slovenia must first explore options for redefining relations 
with the other republics, including defining a procedure for seces-
sion.54 The Yugoslav Presidency has stated that the process of 
constitutional reform in Yugoslavia must be "implemented in a 
peaceful, democratic and legal way based on the Constitution, in 
which the [Yugoslav] Assembly and [A]ssemblies of all republics 
have a clear constitutionally-based role and responsibility."55 
The Yugoslav Constitution56 and the federal government57 tac-
itly acknowledge that a right to secede may exist. In order to 
assert this right successfully, however, Slovenia and Croatia must 
first convince the rest of Yugoslavia that the constitution permits 
separation from the federation and not merely a rearrangement 
of the existing constitutional framework. 58 Furthermore, even if 
the federal government and the other republics were to acknowl-
edge Slovenia's and Croatia's right to secede, these two republics 
would still have to negotiate a procedure for a transition accept-
able to all the parties involved.59 Most notably, secession by Croa-
53 ld. 
54 [d. 
55 [d. The Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly has asked the Assembly Com-
mission for Constitutional Issues to formulate legislation that will resolve the constitutional 
crisis. The Federal Chamber has also called on the Federal Executive Council to "examine 
and assess" the decisions and measures of Slovenia in light of the Council's obligation to 
guarantee constitutional order. SFRY Assembly Federal Chamber Conclusions on Slovene Pleb-
iscite, British Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 22, 1990, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. 
The Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly brought suit in the Constitutional 
Court of Yugoslavia under article 379 of the Yugoslav Constitution challenging Slovene 
legislation allowing the republic to take control of military, foreign, and monetary policies. 
[d. On January II, 1991, the Constitutional Court issued a temporary injunction to 
prevent the Slovene government from taking any steps under the authority granted to it 
by the plebiscite until a final decision on the legality of the vote. The court reasoned that 
an injunction was necessary to avoid "irreparable, harmful consequences." Jonathan S. 
Landay, Court Orders Slovenia to Suspend Moves to Secede, UPI, Jan. II, 1990, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The court held that the Slovene actions impinged on 
"rights and duties" vested in the federal government, and that Slovenia's secession would 
be an unconstitutional, unilateral decision to change Yugoslavia's borders. [d. 
The Yugoslav Presidency initiated a suit in the spring of 1991 to challenge the validity 
of the Slovene and Croatian resolutions and constitutional provisions authorizing seces-
sion. It is apparent that the court will rule in accordance with its previous decision 
disallowing unilateral secession. SFRY Presidency Condemns, supra note 41. 
56 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
57 SFRY Presidency Says, supra note 51. 
58 See RAMET, supra note 22, at 78. 
59 See SFRY Presidency Says, supra note 51. 
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tia would require it to redraw its borders because Serbia will 
demand control over Serbs living in Croatia.60 Redrawing its 
borders is unacceptable to Croatia. Furthermore, Serbia is op-
posed to the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. These factors 
make it difficult for the separatist republics to assert their claims 
pursuant to Yugoslav law. Thus, it is desirable to examine Slov-
enia's and Croatia's actions under international law. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The principle of self-determination has developed in two dis-
tinct historical contexts during the twentieth century-the post-
World War I rise of nationalist movements and the post-World 
War II decolonization process.61 Following World War I, the 
Allies initially emphasized self-determination as a basic right be-
longing to all peoples.62 Commentators also equated the right to 
self-determination with the right of a people to their own inde-
pendent state.63 Following World War II, during the period of 
decolonization, self-determination was viewed as a right of free-
dom from foreign oppression, permitting the inhabitants of ex-
isting territories to assume governmental control.64 Both these 
views influenced the development of the modern concept of self-
determination. 
A. Post-World War I Rise of Nationalist Movements 
The Allies adopted the principle of self-determination in re-
drawing European borders during the Peace Conference of 1919 
following World War 1.65 Woodrow Wilson, perhaps the most 
vocal proponent of self-determination at the time,66 hoped that 
by taking into account the desires of nationalist minority groups, 
the Allies could restructure Europe and ensure lasting world 
60 Chuck Sudetic, Serb Chief Warns of Land Demands, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. II, 1991, at A5. 
61 See Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802, 804 (1980). 
62 COBBAN, supra note 19, at 57. 
63 Id. at 39. 
64 Note, supra note 61, at 804-05. 
65 See UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 
(1972). 
66 Marc Arthur Thibodeau, Comment, The Legality of an Independent Quebec: Canadian 
Constitutional Law and Self-Determination in International Law, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 
99, 126 (1979). 
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peace.67 He believed that satisfying nationalist demands might 
preclude the type of nationalist violence that sparked World War 
1.68 Wilson also believed that the principle of self-determination 
could be used to build a new world order.69 He equated self-
determination with the democratic principle of government by 
consent of the governed.70 Such government would further world 
peace, Wilson believed, because it reflected basic human good-
ness. 71 
Wilson's original vision of self-determination, however, was too 
idealistic to be fully realized.72 Still, it did influence the current 
scope of the principle of self-determination. The Allies and the 
League of Nations applied the principle of self-determination to 
the lands of the vanquished powers in Europe although they did 
not apply it to the Allies' own territories.73 The Allies defined 
peoples as nationalities, utilizing language as a test of nationality. 74 
This definition resulted in the establishment of many new nations, 
but it also created new minorities.75 Nevertheless, the Wilson era 
recognized the principle of self-determination, the use of lan-
guage to define nationality, and the importance of the will of the 
people in implementing self-determination.76 
B. Post-World War II Decolonization Process 
The dismantling of European colonial empires beginning after 
World War II and continuing into the 1960s and 1970s also 
67 COBBAN, supra note 19, at 63. In his Fourteen Points Address to Congress, Wilson 
stated: "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the 
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, 
and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty 
as if they were property." 54 CONGo REc. 17, 442 (1917). 
68 Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 126. 
69 COBBAN, supra note 19, at 63. 
70 [d. 
71 [d. 
72 [d. at 62-63. 
73 [d. at 68. 
74 [d. at 69. 
75 UMOZURIKE, supra note 65, at 21-22. From the Austro·Hungarian Empire, the Allies 
created Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and gave territory to Greece 
and Romania. From the Russian Empire, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
emerged. The Allies, under the supervision of the League of Nations, created mandates 
for the peoples of the Ottoman Empire and the German colonies. The Allies placed these 
peoples under the administration of Allied nations because they were deemed not yet 
ready for self-government. [d. In redrawing borders, the Allies formed new minority 
populations, including the Bulgars of Romania and Yugoslavia, the Magyars of Schutt 
Island, the Germans of Italy, and the Albanians of Yugoslavia. [d. at 22. 
76 !d. at 23. 
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influenced the development of the principle of self-determina-
tion. 77 The principle of self-determination utilized during the 
decolonization era, however, differed fundamentally from the 
principle exercised after World War I. During the decolonization 
era, former colonies, rather than peoples per se, exercised self-
determination. 78 The former colonies retained their colonial bor-
ders as they achieved statehood.79 By maintaining their colonial 
territorial integrity, the new states avoided the conflicts over bor-
ders that can result when a new state is formed from a previously 
existing state.80 Emphasis on territorial integrity thus functioned 
as a limit on the extent to which a group could exercise self-
determination. 81 
C. International Agreements Incorporating the Right to Self-
Determination 
The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter or Charter) ex-
plicitly recognizes the principle of self-determination in articles 
1(2)82 and 55.83 Self-determination is also recognized in Chapters 
XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter. These chapters require trustee 
states of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories to encourage 
self-determination in those territories.84 Furthermore, the 1970 
77 BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 7. 
78 Note, supra note 61, at 805. 
79 See id. 
80 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 7. 
81 See Nanda, supra note 18, at 263-64. 
82 U.N. CHARTER art. I, ~ 2. Article 1(2) states that the purposes of the United Nations 
are "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace .... " Id. 
83 Id. at art. 55. Article 55 states: 
/d. 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: ... universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
84 Id. at art. 73. Article 73 states: 
Id. 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure 
of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants 
of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories, and to this end: ... to develop self-government, to take due account 
of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions .... 
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Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970 Declaration) states: "By 
virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peo-
ple have the right freely to determine, without external interfer-
ence, their political status and to pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. ... "85 The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,86 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,87 and the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries 
(1960 Declaration),88 describe the right to self-determination in a 
similar fashion. Furthermore, a number of General Assembly 
resolutions passed in the context of specific world events also 
refer to the right to self-determination.89 Finally, the United Na-
tions has recognized the utmost importance of the right to self-
determination by declaring it a fundamental human right. 90 
III. THE MODERN CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
A. Defining A People 
A people with a right to self-determination have a right to 
determine their political, economic, social, and cultural status.91 
85 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 
Declaration J. 
86 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 
19,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,1976). 
87 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
88 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries, G.A. Res. 
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 67, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter 
1960 Declaration]. 
89 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 20, U.N. Doc. 
Al8543 (1971). Resolution 2787 "[cJonfirms the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-
determination ... in ... Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (Bissau)," 
and for the Palestinian people. 1d. 
90 The 1970 Declaration states that denying a right of self-determination constitutes "a 
denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter [of the United 
Nations]." 1970 Declaration, supra note 85. The General Assembly "strongly condemned 
all Governments which did not recognize the right to self-determination and indepen-
dence of all peoples still under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation 
.... " 18 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 39 (Jan. 1981). 
9! 1970 Declaration, supra note 85. Scholars have argued both for and against the 
proposition that the principle of self-determination constitutes customary international 
law. UMOZURIKE, supra note 65, at 177. See excerpts of various arguments in MICHLA 
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE ix (1982). For example, one 
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This right, however, is qualified. Perhaps the most significant 
limitations on the right are those imposed by an exact definition 
of the right to self-determination. 
Only a group meeting certain subjective and objective criteria 
can invoke a legitimate claim of self-determination.92 The subjec-
tive standard requires individuals to manifest a desire to form a 
distinct political entity.93 The reasoning underlying this require-
ment is the principle of government by consent of the governed, 
enunciated during the Wilson era. This standard also reflects the 
decolonization era view of self-determination as a right of free-
dom from foreign domination. It can be satisfied by a plebiscite 
on the issue. Thus, before a new government can be established 
for a region, it must have clear popular support.94 
The objective standard requires a group to possess certain 
common characteristics.95 These characteristics may include 
bonds which are racial, historic, geographic, ethnic, economic, 
linguistic, or religious in nature.96 The objective standard derives 
from the Wilson era view of self-determination as a right of 
commentator, ].H.W. Verzijl, has argued: "The right of 'self-determination' ... has never 
been recognized as a genuine positive right of 'peoples' of universal and impartial appli-
cation, and it never will, nor can be so recognized in the future." Id. Another commentator, 
Hector Gros Espiell, has argued the contrary position: "Today no one can challenge the 
fact that, in the light of contemporary international realities, the principle of self-deter-
mination necessarily possesses the character of jus cogens." Id. 
Determining whether a doctrine constitutes customary international law, however, re-
quires ascertaining the practice of states. The notion that self-determination has been the 
practice of states is supported by the fact that only 19 of the 83 existing nations in 1954 
had a continuous existence longer than that of the United States. Furthermore, since the 
formation of the United Nations, more than 70 territories around the world have exer-
cised self-determination during the period of decolonization following World War II. 
John A. Collins, Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. 
]. INT'L L. 137, 147 (1980). Although legal scholars have widely debated the status of self-
determination, the U.N. Charter, numerous U.N. declarations and resolutions, and ju-
dicial opinions have affirmed the right of self-determination. See generally UMOZURIKE, 
supra note 65, at 177-203. The International Court of Justice has recognized the right to 
self-determination as international law in the 1971 Namibia decision and the 1975 Advisory 
Opinion of the Western Sahara. The court stated that developments in the doctrine of self-
determination over the past 50 years have led to its acceptance as international law today. 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa), Notwithstanding Resolution 276 (1970),1971 I.C.]. 16,30-31 (jan. 
26,1971); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.]. 12,31 (Oct. 16, 1975). 
92 BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
93 Note, supra note 61, at 817. 
94 BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 5-6, 10. 
95 [d. at 10. 
96 [d. 
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nationality and the decolonization period view of self-determi-
nation as a fundamental human right. 97 The objective standard 
recognizes the basic human need of groups of individuals with 
common backgrounds to freely associate.98 Defining groups by 
common characteristics is desirable because such characteristics 
are often indicative of group cohesion and the subjective claim 
to exist as a unit.99 
B. Self-Government Versus the Right to Secede 
Although a people may have the right to self-determination, 
they do not have an accompanying right to secede. Following 
World War I, the international legal community initially inter-
preted self-determination to mean the right to exist as an inde-
pendent state. The 1970 Declaration states that self-determina-
tion may be expressed by independence, free association or 
integration with an independent state, or any other freely deter-
mined political status. IOO The idea that self-determination in-
cludes a right to secede is logically derived from the fact that 
where a people are ruled by an oppressive regime, independence 
may be the only way they can pursue their political, economic, 
social, and cultural development. lol 
International law, however, has not generally recognized seces-
sion as part of the right to self-determination except in the con-
text of decolonization. 102 Rather, other norms of international 
law, including the principle of territorial integrity, limit the scope 
of the right to self-determination in international law. 103 Both the 
1970 Declaration and the 1960 Declaration support this view. 
The 1970 Declaration states that the affirmation of self-deter-
mination shall not be "construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and inde-
pendent States . . . ." 104 Likewise, the 1960 Declaration states: 
97 Note, supra note 61, at 805. 
98 See Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination in International Law, 89 YALE L. J. 1247, 1251 
(1980). 
99 Id. at 1250-53. 
100 1970 Declaration, supra note 85, at 124. 
101 Nanda, supra note 18, at 265. 
102 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 16-18. 
103 See Note, supra note 61, at 809. 
104 1970 Declaration, supra note 85, at 124. 
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"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity or political integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations."105 Accordingly, although a people have the right to 
determine their political status, and pursue economic, social, and 
cultural development, they must do so within the existing state; 
a right to secede does not exist for a people outside of a colonial 
context. 
Other principles of international law, as well as the policy that 
international law must be structured to promote peace, also sup-
port the view that a right to secede does not exist. 106 Secession 
disturbs the world order. It disrupts the stability of the parent 
state by depriving it of its power base: people, territory, and 
resources. 107 The reluctance of parent states to accept such losses 
may lead them to violate the basic principles of international law 
prohibiting violence and intervention. 108 This breach may occur 
if a parent state suppresses an uprising, if separatists use force 
to achieve their goal, or if either group retaliates against the other. 
Secession can also lead to intervention by neighboring states that 
sympathize with one side, or by states seeking to prevent the 
conflict from spreading. 
Some commentators have argued that the right to self-deter-
mination is even more limited, applying only to former colonial 
peoples. 109 The United Nations passed many resolutions affirm-
ing self-determination during the period of decolonization fol-
lowing World War II. The perception then may have been that 
self-determination applied only in the context of decoloniza-
tion.110 It is not clear, however, that this limited perception existed 
when the General Assembly passed both the 1960 Declaration 
and 1970 Declaration. lll Contemporaneous documents declare 
that all people have a right to self-determination, and many doc-
uments refer not only to the right to be free from colonialism 
105 1960 Declaration, supra note 88, at ~ 6. 
106 Nanda, supra note 18, at 263. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 264. 
109 See, e.g., RUPERT EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECO-
LONIZATION, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 30 (1964). 
110 See Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 130-31. 
111 Id. 
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but also from "racist regimes or other forms of alien domina-
tion."112 
The 1970 Declaration arguably legitimizes secession in certain 
situations outside the context of decolonization. 113 The Declara-
tion states that territorial integrity applies only to those "sovereign 
and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour."ll4 This suggests that a group may exercise self-
determination by secession if the state from which it is seceding 
maintains a nonrepresentative government. ll5 Furthermore, the 
1970 Declaration implies that a group may legitimately secede if 
it can show unequal treatment of a particular racial or ethnic 
group by the state. 116 Divergent political beliefs, claims to re-
sources, or ethnic or cultural identification, however, do not es-
tablish a right to secede. ll7 Rather, a people must demonstrate 
that the parent state has violated their human rights or denied 
them participation in government in order to establish a right to 
secede. 
Self-determination should be recognized outside of the colonial 
context. As a fundamental right, it is applicable to all people, not 
only to those with a certain historical background. It would be 
illogical to guarantee self-determination to some groups and to 
deny it to others. To recognize a right of secession for a people 
in the context of colonization but to deny this right to a people 
subjugated in a different historical context is inconsistent. This 
is especially true when a people may have suffered equally as 
much, but only in a different context. IIB 
Another limitation on the right to self-determination is that a 
people exercising self-determination have the duty to exercise 
112 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974). The odious history of colonizing powers exploiting indigenous people and their 
lands may explain why a right to self-determination is so well recognized in the context 
of decolonization. BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 18. Furthermore, recognizing self-deter-
mination for colonial peoples reaffirms the equality of people around the globe, including 
the equality of third world states and traditional world powers. 
113 Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 132-33. 
114 1970 Declaration, supra note 85. 
115 See Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 132-33. 
116 [d. at 130-32. 
117 See Nanda, supra note 18, at 277. 
lIB BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
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their right without causing undue economic and political impact 
on the parent state. llg Additionally, such a people cannot exercise 
their right at the expense of the legitimate rights of other peoples 
living in the parent state. 120 There is a range of political relation-
ships short of independence which can exist between a parent 
state and a people exercising its right to self-determination. Such 
relationships may allow a group to exercise self-determination 
without infringing on other norms of international law. A political 
relationship short of independence may also be in the best eco-
nomic and political interests of the self-determining group. 
IV. SLOVENIA'S AND CROATIA'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
A group can exercise a right to self-determination where it can 
show: (1) the group constitutes a people under the subjective and 
objective standards; and (2) the people seek to determine their 
political status, and pursue economic, social, and cultural devel-
opment. Under the 1970 Declaration, a people should also be 
entitled to self-determination by secession if they can show that 
the group is governed by a non-representative government or 
that the people have been subject to unequal treatment within 
the state. 
A. Slovenes and Croats As Peoples 
1. Subjective Standard 
Under international law, the Slovenes and Croats are peoples 
who have a right to self-determination. Slovenia and Croatia both 
satisfy the subjective standard because the large majority of each 
republic's population favors autonomy, or in the alternative, in-
dependence. 121 The plebiscites of December 23, 1990 and May 
19, 1991 are evidence of these desires. 122 Furthermore, the Slov-
enes and Croats satisfy the subjective standard because the ma-
jority of each ethnic group views itself as a people distinct from 
the other peoples of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the 
world. 123 Additionally, both groups consider themselves sover-
eign. 
119 Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 139. 
120 [d. 
121 See Landay, supra note 27 (Slovenia); Lookers-On, supra note 40 (Croatia). 
122 See Landay, supra note 27 (Slovenia); Lookers-On, supra note 40 (Croatia). 
123 See Landay, supra note 27 (Slovenia); Lookers-On, supra note 40 (Croatia). 
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2. Objective Standard 
Slovenes and Croats also satisfy the objective standard and thus 
they are peoples under international law. Within each group, 
there are common identifying characteristics. 124 These character-
istics include geographic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, economic, 
and historical bonds. 125 
a. Geography 
Slovenes and Croats generally reside within geographical 
boundaries distinct from the other peoples of Yugoslavia. 126 Fur-
thermore, the current republican borders closely correspond to 
the original borders of the lands that joined together to form 
Yugoslavia in 1918.127 Although Slovenia and Croatia possess 
definitive borders, both republics contain ethnic minorities from 
other republics, especially Serbs. The minority populations in 
Slovenia and Croatia, however, are relatively small,128 and thus 
their existence should not undermine the republics' claim to a 
distinct geography. 
Still, the Serbian population of Croatia may be an obstacle to 
Croatian secession. In fact, Serbia has voiced special concern 
about the future of Croatia's Serbian minority should Croatia 
secede. 129 Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, has declared 
that if Croatia secedes, Serbia's borders should be redrawn to 
encompass those Serbs presently living in Croatia. 130 It will be 
difficult for Croatia to accede to this demand because Serbs are 
not concentrated along the borders of Croatia and most of Croa-
tia does not border Serbia. 131 
124 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 14, at 10. 
125 Id. 
126 For a complete discussion of Yugoslavia's geography and borders, see Danforth, 
supra note 21, at 104-0S. 
127 FRED SINGLETON, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES 209 (1984). 
128 Serbs comprise 2.S percent of the population of Slovenia, and about 13 percent of 
the population of Croatia. There are approximately 600,000 Serbs in Croatia's total 
population of 4.S million people. By comparison, there are approximately SO,OOO Serbs 
in Slovenia's total population of 2 million. See Brenda Fowler, Slovenes Vote Decisively for 
Independence From Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,1990, at 37 (Slovenia); Carol]. Williams, 
Yugoslavia Near Breaking Point as Talks Fail, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1991, at I (Croatia). 
129 See Sudetic, supra note 60. 
130 Id. 
131 See Danforth, supra note 21, at 104-0S. 
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b. Ethnicity 
Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bos-
nians form distinct ethnic groups, but each group is a member 
of the broader ethnic classification of Slavs. 132 This fact, however, 
does not significantly affect the claim of Slovenes and Croats to 
autonomy or a separate state. Poles, Czechs, and Russians, for 
example, are also Slavs and they possess their own states. 133 Sim-
ilarly the Germans and Dutch are distinct ethnic groups, but they 
are also members of the broader ethnic classification of Germanic 
peoples, and they possess their own states. 
c. Language 
The Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Montenegrins speak Serbo-
Croatian. 134 Serbian and Croatian nationalists, however, have ar-
gued that there is a separate Serbian language and a separate 
Croatian language. 135 The dispute, in reality, is more political 
than linguistic. 136 The major difference between the two is that 
132 See SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 14, 100. Approximately 83 percent of the popu-
lation of Yugoslavia is Slavic. David Binder, National Rivalries Cloud Dream of Yugoslav 
Unity, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1991, at 4. Ethnically, Bosnians are classified as Muslim-Slavs. 
Both Serbs and Croats claim that Bosnians are members of their respective ethnic groups 
who were converted to Islam during the Ottoman occupation from the fourteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries. They refer to this period as the "long Turkish night." SINGLETON, 
supra note 127, at 21. The Hungarians of Vojvodina and the Albanians of Kosovo are 
not Slavs. Binder, supra. 
133 See SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 14. 
134 See RAMET, supra note 22, at 108. The Macedonians, Albanians, and the Hungarians 
speak their own languages, as do the multitude of ethnic groups within Yugoslavia. 
135 See id.; Ivo BANAC, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, 
POLITICS 211 (1984). 
136 RAMET, supra note 22, at 109. The actual differences between Serbian and Croatian 
dialects stem from the language differences that the original Slav invaders brought with 
them to the Balkan peninsula in the sixth century A.D. By medieval times, Croats spoke 
three dialects: cakavian, kajkavian, and old western stokavian; Serbs spoke two dialects: 
old eastern stokavian and torlak. After the twelfth century, the Serbian dialect of old 
eastern stokavian and the Croatian dialect of old western stokavian merged into a new 
dialect, neostokavian. Around 1700, after a period of migrations within the region, 
neostokavian developed into three subdialects (ijekavian, ikavian, and ekavian). These 
three subdialects can be broken down into seven more subdialects. Today Serbs, Croats, 
Bosnians, and Montenegrins still speak all of these dialects, including those originating 
in medieval times. Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, however, are divided by the different 
dialects. 
The ijeckavian dialect has three subdialects: East Hercegovinian (spoken by Serbs, 
Bosnian Muslims, and Croats of Southern Dalmatia); East Bosnian (spoken by Serbs and 
Bosnian Muslims); and Zeta (spoken by Montenegrins). The ikavian dialect has two 
subdialects: Western (spoken by Croats and Bosnian Muslims) and Slavonian (spoken by 
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written Serbian uses the Cyrillic alphabet while Croatian uses the 
Latin alphabet. 
The similarity between Serbian and Croatian dialects is illus-
trated by the fact that linguists from both republics met in 1954 
to collaborate in the creation of a common orthography in a 
definitive Serbo-Croatian dictionary.137 When the first two vol-
umes of the dictionary appeared in 1967, however, Croatian lin-
guists denounced the work. They objected to the dictionary be-
cause it presented words from Serbian dialects as standard and 
words from Croatian dialects as deviations. 138 The Croatian cul-
tural association therefore withdrew from the joint project in 
1970.139 In addition to aggravating ethnic relations, the publica-
tion of this dictionary led to the 1971 publication of the Croatian 
Orthography.140 Thus, language identifies Croats as a distinct peo-
ple under the objective standard. 
The Slovene language emerged from the medieval Croatian 
dialect, cakavian, through the work of the leading Slovene Prot-
estant reformer, Primoz Trubar (1508-1586).141 Trubar laid the 
foundation for a Slovene literature and a unitary linguistic stan-
dard. 142 The development of the Slovene language was of para-
mount importance in creating Slovene national consciousness. 143 
Language, therefore, also identifies the Slovenes as a distinct 
people under the objective standard. 
d. Religion 
Croats and Slovenes are primarily Roman Catholics. Serbs, 
Montenegrins, and Macedonians are primarily Eastern Orthodox 
Christians. 144 The Muslim-Slavs of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the 
Croats). The ekavian dialect has two subdialects: Sumadija-Vojvodina (spoken by Serbs) 
and Kosova-Resava (spoken by Serbs). BANAC. supra note 135. at 46-47. 
1S7 RAMET. supra note 22. at 107-0B. 
138 Id. at lOB. 
139 Id. at 109. 
140 Id. Broz-Ivekovic produced the Dictionary of the Croatian Language in 1901. and it 
was considered authoritative until 196B. when Ljudevit Jonke. President of the Croatian 
Cultural Association. published an article criticizing the work for relying heavily on 
Serbian sources and for citing Serbian roots as the origins of about 90 percent of the 
words.ld. 
141 BANAC. supra note 135. at 112. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 113. 
144 The line dividing Yugoslavia into Western and Eastern Christians is attributable to 
the division of the Roman Empire by Diocletian. Christianity in the Western Roman 
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vast majority of Albanians of Kosovo are Islamic. 145 In this con-
text, the Croats' and Slovenes' religious beliefs identify them as 
distinct peoples under the objective standard. 
e. Economy 
Slovenia is Yugoslavia's most prosperous and most industrial-
ized republic. 146 Croatia is its second most wealthy republic. 147 
Combined, the two republics produce approximately 50 percent 
of Yugoslavia's total exports and they enjoy the highest standards 
of living in Yugoslavia. 148 Thus, Croatia's and Slovenia's advanced 
economic development helps identify their peoples as distinct 
under the objective standard. 
f. History 
Although the CItIzens of Yugoslavia have shared a common 
state since 1918, their common history ends there. 149 The first 
Slavic tribes invaded the home of the Romanized Illyrians in the 
fourth century A.D.1s0 The Croats settled in their present home-
land by the seventh century A.D.151 In 803, they accepted the 
rule of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne, but by the late 
ninth century, the Byzantines had asserted control over them. 152 
In 924, Tomislav declared himself King of the Croats and formed 
an independent kingdom which flourished throughout the tenth 
and eleventh centuries. 153 The kingdom probably extended from 
the Adriatic coast from Rijeka to the Neretva River, inland to the 
Hungarian border north of Zagreb and to the Drine Valley in 
the south. 154 At the beginning of the twelfth century, the ruling 
Empire flourished under the influence of Rome, but in the East the influence of Con-
stantinople dominated. The official split between the two faiths occurred in the eleventh 
century. Vojislav Stanovcic, History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts, in YUGOSLAVIA: A FRAC-
TURED FEDERALISM 23, 25 (D. Rusinow ed., 1988). 
145 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
146 See Blaine Harden, Slovenia Takes Steps to Quit Yugoslavia, WASH. PosT,Jan. 22,1991, 
at A5. 
147 See Smolowe, supra note 4, at 28. 
148 Id. 
149 McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 4. 
150 SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 10-13. 
151 Id. at 28. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 28-29. 
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dynasty lacked an heir. The ensuing succession crisis was resolved 
with the accession of Prince Kalman of Hungary to the throne 
of Croatia in 1102.155 When Kalman inherited the Hungarian 
throne in 1106, Croatia began an 800 year history under Hun-
garian rule. 156 After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in World War I, Croatia joined the other South Slav states to 
form Yugoslavia.' 57 
The Slovenes built a Slavonic empire in the seventh century 
under the ruler Samo.158 The state lasted for a short period. 
After the fall of the kingdom, Slovenes lived under Austrian rule 
until the formation of Yugoslavia. 159 
The history of the other South Slav states is considerably dif-
ferent from that of Croatia and Slovenia. Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia have existed as parts of 
other empires. Serbs formed their own state in the ninth, elev-
enth, and nineteenth centuries. '60 Montenegrins formed a state 
distinct from Serbia in the fourteenth century.161 Bosnians also 
possessed an empire in the fourteenth century l62 and 
Macedonians l63 created an empire in the tenth century. 
The common history of the South Slav peoples officially began 
on December 1, 1918, when King Alexander Karadjordjevic pro-
claimed the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. 164 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes agreed, with the approval 
of the World War I Allies, to form Yugoslavia from the indepen-
dent states of Serbia and Montenegro, and territories from the 
defeated Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. '65 This union 
lasted as a parliamentary democracy until 1929, when King Al-
exander established a royal dictatorship. 166 King Alexander acted 
in response to the considerable strife plaguing the kingdom, in-
155 [d. at 29. 
156 [d. 
157 See McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 4. 
158 SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 34. 
159 See id. 
160 For a general history of the Serbs, see SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 24-28. 
161 For a general history of the Montenegrins, see SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 29-
31. 
162 For a general history of the Bosnians, see SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 31-32. 
163 For a general history of the Macedonians, see SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 32-34. 
164 [d. at 130. 
165 [d. at 127. 
166 [d. at 145. 
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eluding ethnic and elass tensions. 167 The royal dictatorship ended 
with the assassination of King Alexander, arranged by a Croat 
separatist, in 1934. 168 The kingdom was then ruled by a Council 
of Regents for the young Prince Paul, but the state disintegrated 
with the Axis invasion of 1941. 169 
The current Yugoslav system was established after the uprising 
of J osip Broz Tito's Communist Partisans and the Serbian royalist 
Cetniks against Germany and Italy in World War II. During the 
war, the Partisans and the Cetniks waged a civil war that resulted 
in a Partisan and Communist victory.17D The constitution of the 
new regime created a federation of six republics and two prov-
inces representing the major ethnic groups. At first, the central 
government maintained strong control of the state. l7l Later, how-
ever, governmental reforms gave increased power to the repub-
lics. By 1974, a series of constitutional amendments, and finally 
a new constitution, had further institutionalized republican power 
and Yugoslavia appeared to be developing into a de facto con-
federation. 172 Communists lost power in Slovenia, Croatia, Bos-
nia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia in 1989, but have retained con-
trol in Serbia and Montenegro. 173 
B. The Slovene and Croat Proposal for Exercising Self-Determination 
As peoples, Slovenes and Croats have the right to self-deter-
mination under international law. Slovenes and Croats mani-
fested a desire to exercise this right when officials from Slovenia 
167 See McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 4-5. 
168 See SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 162-63. 
169 [d. at 145. A fascist Croatian party, the Ustase, established the Independent State 
of Croatia. The Germans occupied Serbia and partitioned it, giving territory to Hungary 
and the Italian colony of Albania. Bulgaria annexed Macedonia. Italy and Germany 
divided Slovenia. The Italians occupied Montenegro. 
The fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia declared one of its chief aims 
was to purge Croatia of alien groups, especially Serbs. The new state would have two 
religions, Roman Catholicism and Islam. To achieve this goal, the facists intended to 
exterminate one-third of the Serbian population, deport one-third, and convert one-third 
to Catholicism. The actual number of Serbs exterminated by the Ustase is unknown. 
Serbia estimates the number at 750,000, but the German estimate is 350,000. The Nu-
remburg trials condemned the Croatian policy toward the Serbs as genocide. [d. at 177. 
170 See McFARLANE, supra note 22, at 6. 
17l SINGLETON, supra note 127, at 211. 
172 Denison Rusinow, Nationalities Policy and the "National Question", in YUGOSLAVIA IN 
THE 1980s 131, 136 (P. Ramet ed., 1985). 
173 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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and Croatia jointly proposed a model confederation. 174 The 
model confederation establishes a system in which each of the 
peoples of Yugoslavia could govern themselves while maintaining 
certain common ties. 175 The model confederation is based on 
generalizations of confederations from history, as well as on the 
structure of the European Community.176 
The model confederation establishes an alliance of indepen-
dent states bound together by the promise of mutual defense.177 
Each member state would possess its own armed forces while 
pledging to "regard any armed attack on the territory, ships or 
aircraft of any member as an attack on all of them."17S The 
confederation would also further economic interests by establish-
ing a common market. 179 To further the goals of the member 
states, the confederation treaty guarantees certain rights to the 
citizens of each member state. ISO Citizens of one member state 
living in another would have the same rights of citizens in that 
other member state. lSI The free movement of citizens, as well as 
labor, would be permitted through member states. 182 The pro-
posed confederation would also establish common postal, railway, 
and telecommunications systems. IS3 The confederation would be 
governed, and the confederation treaty enforced, by an Advisory 
Parliament, a Council of Ministers, an Executive Commission, 
and a Con federal Court. 1S4 
The proposed confederation exceeds the bounds of the right 
to self-determination; the treaty amounts to a declaration of seces-
sion rather than self-determination. The confederation does not 
contemplate a redistribution of rights in governing the state, or 
174 Model Confederation, supra note 39. The Presidencies of Slovenia and Croatia jointly 
proposed a model confederation on October 5, 1990. The model was drafted pursuant 
to an agreement with the Yugoslav Presidency in July 1990. Slovenia and Croatia have 
urged the other republics and provinces to draft models as well. 
175 Id. 
176 /d. 
177 Id. 
178 Croat Presidency Draft Treaty on Yugoslav Confederation, British Broadcasting Corp., 
Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current 
File [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. 
179 Model Confederation, supra note 39. 
180 Draft Treaty, supra note 178. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 /d. 
184 Id. 
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even a call for local autonomy.185 Rather, the model dissolves 
Yugoslavia. It provides for the type of amicable cooperation that 
exists in such organizations as the United Nations, the EC, and 
the Organization of American States. 186 Furthermore, treaty pro-
visions allow member states to individually or collectively leave 
the confederation to apply for membership in the EC.187 This 
suggests that the confederation will serve more as an intermediate 
stage in the process of European integration than as a foundation 
for a permanent state. 188 
To establish the model confederation, Slovenia and Croatia 
need the consent of the other Yugoslav republics. Creation of a 
confederation without the approval of these republics would 
amount to an act of secession. If Slovenia and Croatia do not 
have the right to secede, they may need to alter the proposed 
confederation model so that they retain local autonomy, but ac-
knowledge the role of a central government. 
C. Legitimacy of Secession 
The 1970 Declaration can be interpreted to permit secession 
where an existing government does not act in compliance with 
the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 189 
To justify secession in such a situation, a people must show that 
the government is nonrepresentative or that it treats a particular 
racial or ethnic group unequally.190 Yugoslavia does, in fact, pos-
sess a representative government,191 but Slovenia and Croatia 
185 See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. 
186 [d. 
187 See Draft Treaty, supra note 178. 
188 [d. 
189 Thibodeau, supra note 66, at 132-33. 
190 [d. 
191 Yugoslavia's constitutional framework ensures representative government by giving 
each republic an equal voice in one of the chambers of the federal legislature. Giving 
each republic an equal voice actually benefits Slovenia and Croatia to the detriment of 
the other republics. An equal voice overrepresents smaller republics and underrepresents 
larger republics. Slovenia and Croatia are smaller than Serbia, and Slovenia is smaller 
than Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 
In the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, each republic has twelve delegates and 
each province has eight. These delegates are required to represent the views of their 
respective republican or provincial legislatures in the national legislature. Furthermore, 
the Yugoslav constitution requires the unanimous consent of all federal units in the 
Chamber of Republics and Provinces in many legislative areas. In the other house of the 
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might justify secession by showing the unequal treatment of Slov-
enes and Croats. 
Slovenia, Croatia, and many of the other constituent parts of 
Yugoslavia, could probably adduce evidence of unequal treat-
ment by citing incidents throughout Yugoslav history. 192 Unequal 
treatment of ethnic groups has often occurred as Yugoslav gov-
ernments throughout the state's history have attempted to solve 
the "national question"-how to achieve the harmonious co-ex-
istence of Yugoslavia's ethnic groups within a single state. 193 A 
solution must diminish potential Serbian domination of the Yu-
goslav state, as well as dispel deep-rooted fears of such domina-
tion. Politicians have frequently claimed to have solved the na-
tional question, but crises in ethnic relations have recurred 
throughout Yugoslav history. 
Although unequal treatment of ethnic groups has existed in 
Yugoslavia, it is probably not the type of treatment that validates 
a claim to secession. Unequal treatment has almost always oc-
curred in the context of federal government responses to crises 
in ethnic relations. Thus, it can be justified by the federal gov-
ernment's right to take appropriate measures to preserve the 
union and maintain order.194 
In the current crisis, the most drastic measure taken by the 
federal government has been the use of the Yugoslav army in 
national legislature, the Federal Chamber, thirty delegates represent each republic and 
twenty represent each province. 
The Yugoslav constitutional system also provides for an equal voice for each federal 
unit in the process of amending the constitution. The passage of an amendment requires 
that the text adopted by the federal chamber (where a two-thirds majority is required) 
must be ratified by the legislatures of all federal units. See Vojislav Kostunica, The Consti-
tution and the Federal States, in YUGOSLAVIA: A FRACTURED FEDERALISM 78, 80-82 (D. 
Rusinowed., 1988). 
192 See generally Stanovcic, supra note 144, at 23-40. 
193 See generally Rusinow, supra note 172, at 131-65. A crisis fueled by nationalist and 
decentralist demands also threatened Yugoslavia between 1968 and 1972. Nationalism in 
Croatia resulted in a breakdown in federal law-making and administration because of 
veto power granted by the federal constitutional amendment of 1974. The crisis culmi-
nated when Tito threatened to use the army to put down the forces dividing the country. 
Tito purged the Croatian leadership of "nationalists" and "liberals," and later extended 
the purges to leaders in Slovenia, Serbia, Vojvodina, and Macedonia. Tito's reforms 
returned the Communist Party to a more centralized, disciplined, and authoritarian role, 
enabling it to maintain control over the country. See generally, RAMET, supra note 22, at 
104-43. 
194 See supra note 29. 
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Slovenia and Croatia. 195 The legitimacy of federal military actions 
must be assessed in light of the breakdown of negotiations in the 
federation/confederation dispute and the steps taken by Slovenia 
and Croatia toward secession. 196 Unequal treatment of Slovenia 
and Croatia in the present situation is probably justified and 
probably does not rise to a level giving the republics a right to 
secede. 
CONCLUSION 
The Yugoslav Constitution probably recognizes a republican 
right to self-determination, including the right to secede. Practical 
considerations, however, prevent Slovenia and Croatia from ex-
ercising that constitutional right. Under international law, Slov-
enia and Croatia have a right to self-determination because Slov-
enes and Croats each qualify as distinct peoples. Each satisfies 
the subjective standard for definition as a peoples because each 
voted for independence. In addition, both Croats and Slovenes 
satisfy the objective standard because each possesses a significant 
number of objective characteristics. 
While Slovenes and Croats have the right to self-determination, 
they do not have the right to secede. The right to secede is not 
recognized under international law. Although Slovenia and Croa-
tia may not secede, it may be in the best interests of all Yugo-
slavia's ethnic groups to agree to allow each to choose its own 
political future. History shows that the forced association of the 
Yugoslav peoples has periodically resulted in violence. Dissolving 
the federation will put an end to the current warfare and perhaps 
prevent future bloodshed. If each of the peoples of Yugoslavia 
is free to exercise its right to self-determination, and even secede, 
recurring nationalist desires will be satisfied and each of the 
peoples of Yugoslavia will be free to pursue political, economic, 
social, and cultural development unimpeded. 
Richard F. Iglar 
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196 See supra notes 40-41. 
